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Originalism from the Soft Southern Strategy
to the New Right: The Constitutional Politics
of Sam Ervin Jr

Abstract: Although originalism’s emergence as an important theory of constitutional
interpretation is usually attributed to eﬀorts by the Reagan administration, the role the
theory played in the South’s determined resistance to civil rights legislation in the
1960s actually helped create the Reagan coalition in the ﬁrst place. North Carolina
Senator Sam Ervin Jr., the constitutional theorist of the Southern Caucus, developed
and deployed originalism because he saw its potential to stymie civil rights legislation
and stabilize a Democratic coalition under signiﬁcant stress. Ervin failed in those
eﬀorts, but his turn to originalism had lasting eﬀects. The theory helped Ervin and
other conservative southerners explain to outsiders and to themselves why they shifted
from support for an interventionist state powerful enough to enforce segregation to an
ideology founded on individual rights and liberty. It thus eased the South’s integration
with the emerging New Right.
Keywords: Party politics, civil rights, originalism, constitutional law, New Right

Sam Ervin Jr. spent ﬁve years on the North Carolina Supreme Court from 1949
to 1954.1 During that time, he expressed no qualms about his state’s system of
racial segregation, which included a dizzying array of statutes that regulated
the movement, association, education, and employment of North Carolinians,
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both black and white; one statute even outlawed fraternal orders that allowed
blacks and whites to address one another as brother.2 Ervin’s support for those
invasive restrictions on individual autonomy, in fact, helped him become a
Democratic US senator in 1954, when the governor appointed him to a
vacancy after the presumed front-runner ruined his chances by encouraging
his fellow citizens to obey the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.3 By
1966, however, Ervin regularly claimed that the Constitution prohibited racebased government programs of any kind, and he viewed the protection of
individual rights from both state and federal authorities as the core of his
political philosophy.
As Ervin shifted from a communitarian embrace of state power, where the
federal government was the primary threat to liberty and federalism the
primary protection, to a political ideology grounded on individual rights
and skeptical of government authority at both the federal and state level, he
faced no serious threat to his election to a full Senate term in 1956 or reelection
in 1962 and 1968. Nor did that shift change his identiﬁcation as a conservative.4
Ervin was instead traveling the same path as many of his constituents, who
were shifting from a conservatism that Kevin Kruse has described as based on
“traditionalist, populist, and often starkly racist demagoguery” to a conservatism “predicated on a language of rights, freedom, and individualism.”5
Ervin, however, did more than merely participate in this shift. As the
constitutional theorist of the South’s determined resistance to civil rights
legislation through the mid-1960s, he developed and defended legal and
constitutional arguments that provided a pathway he and other conservative
southerners followed to this new political ideology.6 In 1956, Ervin embraced a
theory of constitutional originalism that foreshadowed the approach of
today’s conservative movement—and then, over the ensuing decades, used
it to explain to both outsiders and southerners themselves how their shifting
views of state authority were not self-serving responses to federal civil rights
laws or their own increasing move to the suburbs, where an interventionist
state became a threat to, rather than a protector of, their privileges.7 Ervin’s
originalist arguments portrayed that shift as no shift at all, but instead as a
consistent embrace of traditional conceptions of liberty, fundamental to
American government and society, made legally binding by the Constitution.
By easing this shift to a new, individual rights-based conservatism, Ervin’s
constitutional arguments helped conservative southern Democrats ﬁnd common ground with anti–New Deal Republicans outside the South, some of
whom were exploring similar constitutional arguments, and the vast majority
of whom were happy to ﬁnd new allies in their eﬀorts to turn the GOP into a
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political vehicle for the conservative movement.8 During an intensely competitive North Carolina Senate race in 1984, conservative Republican Jesse
Helms, with help from Ronald Reagan, worked to associate himself with
Ervin’s legacy. Helms, who had made originalist noises himself as a prosegregation newspaper editor in 1963, ran ads touting his relationship with Ervin
and justiﬁed his opposition to the renewal of the 1965 voting rights act by
appealing to Ervin’s constitutional expertise.9 When asked about Helms’s
eﬀorts, Ervin said he planned to vote the straight Democratic ticket, just as he
always had. But he also declined to endorse either candidate or deny his
relationship with Helms. “I’ll do anything for Jesse Helms except voting for
him on the Republican ticket. . . . We’ve been friends for years.” The only
complaint Ervin was willing to lodge against Helms was that he “should have
stayed in the Democratic Party and helped me.”10
Originalism’s role in redeﬁning southern conservatism and thus helping
to produce the contemporary Republican Party has not received its due for at
least two reasons. First, with a small but growing number of exceptions,
discussions of originalism past have focused on the theory’s emergence from
academic debates in the 1970s.11 Second, Ervin failed in what he saw as his
most important tasks in the 1950s and 60s: protecting segregation and the
power of the Democratic Party in the South.12 That failure can make Ervin’s
embrace of originalism appear to be the last, desperate gasp of a dying political
order. But originalism was much more than a post-hoc rationalization for the
immediate political goals of Ervin and his political allies. Among other things,
it was an ideological and rhetorical pathway through which a potentially
antagonistic relationship between southern Democrats and anti–New Deal
Republicans became natural alliance. It guided southern democrats to a new
political identity, and thereby helped support, even create, the durable shift in
governing authority formalized by the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.13
Recovering the way Ervin deﬁned, deployed, and redeﬁned originalism shows
that a constitutional theory generally understood to be a product of the New
Right actually helped create that coalition in the ﬁrst place.

from the court to the senate
When North Carolina Democratic senator Clyde Hoey died in his oﬃce in the
US Senate ﬁve days before the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education, Ervin was not the governor’s ﬁrst choice to ﬁll Hoey’s seat. The
appointment fell to Ervin because he had kept clear of factional conﬂict within
North Carolina’s dominant Democratic Party and because the governor’s
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presumed frontrunner for the appointment had publicly suggested that the
state should begin desegregating its schools in response to the decision. Ervin,
however, seemed like the ideal person to defend segregation in post–Brown
Washington. A graduate of the University of North Carolina and Harvard Law
School as well as a state Supreme Court justice, Ervin had the professional
credentials and expertise to mount a constitutional critique of Brown and any
other federal challenge to segregation.14
Although Ervin ultimately failed to protect legally enforced segregation
from federal law, he spent his ﬁrst decade in oﬃce aggressively defending it
alongside the other Democratic senators and representatives who had organized themselves into the Southern Caucus. He attacked Brown at his ﬁrst
press conference, and in his ﬁrst major speech he gave an extended critique of
the decision.15 A year later Ervin helped draft the Southern Manifesto—the
Southern Caucus’s formal response to Brown—and then used his seat on the
Judiciary Committee and his chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights to oppose civil rights legislation.16 In his ﬁrst decade as a
senator, he opposed every civil rights bill between 1954 and his retirement in
1974, and participated prominently in ﬁlibusters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other civil rights legislation.”17
Ervin was stalwart in his defense of segregation, but the arguments he
used changed signiﬁcantly over time. By 1965, Ervin’s constitutional critiques
of civil rights legislation had made him the most visible and consistent
defender of originalism in American politics.18 Ervin, however, was not an
originalist when he was on the North Carolina Supreme Court. None of his
opinions explicitly used the originalist method Ervin later claimed was the
only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. Ervin did not deny
that original meanings were relevant, yet his approach is best described as
traditional, combining attention to text, history, prudence, principle, and a
heavy emphasis on interpreting existing precedent to resolve constitutional
disputes.19
Nor was Ervin’s initial critique of Brown originalist. His attack on the
decision in an April 1955 speech at the Harvard Club of New York, published in
Vital Speeches of the Day, emphasized the Court’s use of social science data and
its rejection of precedent.20 To be sure, Ervin emphasized the genius of those
who drafted the Constitution—but all methods of constitutional interpretation acknowledge that original meaning is relevant to constitutional analysis.21 Originalism goes further, claiming that the intention of the Founders or
the original understanding of the document is binding law and capable of
deciding important, contested issues of constitutional law.22 Yet Ervin did not
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make that claim in this speech, and in fact never mentioned the drafters or
ratiﬁers of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Supreme Court Justice, said Ervin,
must “lay aside his personal notions of what the law ought to be, and to base
his decisions on established legal precedents and rules.”23 The Brown court
had erred because it “repudiates solely upon the basis of psychology and
sociology the interpretation placed upon the 14th amendment in respect to
racial segregation by Federal and State courts, the Congress itself, and executive branches of the Federal and State Governments throughout the preceding 86 years.”24
If Ervin was seeking the best legal argument against Brown, he was wise
not to adopt originalism. The theory had virtually no support among legal
academics, was most closely associated with the aggressive use of judicial
review, and appealing to it was unnecessary to make Ervin’s point. Legal
academics associated originalism with the viliﬁed Four Horsemen who
opposed the New Deal and the reviled decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.25
On the Supreme Court, only Justice Hugo Black was arguably a proponent of
the approach.26 But Black had joined the Brown decision, and in 1955 his
jurisprudence was most closely associated with eﬀorts to protect accused
Communists and criminal defendants.27 There were arguments—strong,
but also contested—that the original intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were inconsistent with Brown.28 But because everyone
agreed that original intent was relevant to constitutional adjudication, calling
on originalism for support was unnecessary.29 In addition, Ervin could easily
ﬁnd nonoriginalist grounds to criticize Brown and the Warren Court, including a long-established interpretive tradition that included some of the most
prestigious jurists and academics of the previous seven decades: process
jurisprudence.
Process jurisprudence was the dominant theory of constitutional interpretation during the 1950s and ’60s. It built on a respected tradition of judicial
deference to legislative majorities that its supporters traced from Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis D. Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter.30 Its
emphasis on the deference that the courts owed to the other two branches of
government, plus its insistence that judicial review was justiﬁed only if the
principle at stake was clear and well established, could be—and was—
deployed to criticize Brown.31 In a lecture he delivered at Harvard in 1958,
Judge Learned Hand criticized the Warren Court and Brown in particular
because the Court was acting as “a third legislative chamber,” illegitimately
substituting its own value judgments for those of Congress.32 A year later
Herbert Wechsler argued that the Court in Brown had failed to provide the
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kind of “neutral principles” that alone made judicial review legitimate.33 In the
mid-1960s and later, both Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland criticized the
Warren Court on similar grounds.34
Ervin thus did not need originalism to make a strong legal argument
against Brown, and using it as the basis of his critique would have made his
argument weaker, not stronger, in the eyes of legal professionals. Ervin
correctly saw that he was better oﬀ using process jurisprudence’s focus on
the careful use of precedent to identify underlying principles to critique
Brown. But as Ervin’s concerns increasingly shifted from ﬁnding the legal
argument most convincing to legal professionals to ﬁnding the legal argument
most likely to help him solve an increasingly diﬃcult and complex set of
political challenges, he discovered some unique virtues in originalism.

from precedent to original intent
Ervin began to change the jurisprudential basis of his challenge to desegregation just one year after his Harvard Club speech, when he helped draft the
Southern Manifesto. The Manifesto, formally entitled the Declaration of
Constitutional Principles, was the Southern Caucus’s oﬃcial response to
Brown. Written by the best lawyers in the caucus, it used constitutional
arguments for a political purpose: to attract sympathy from moderates, in
the North and South, while simultaneously stoking just enough segregationist
anger to prevent a third-party challenge to the Democratic Party in the
South.35 The Southern Caucus had long used constitutional arguments and
appeals to the Founding Fathers to protect segregation, but as Ervin turned his
focus from ﬁnding the best legal argument against Brown to helping his
colleagues develop constitutional arguments that could support a successful
political coalition, his jurisprudence also shifted.36 When the debates over the
1957 Civil Rights Act started the next session, Ervin was ready to claim that
originalism was the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation.
Work on the manifesto began in the shadow of the 1956 elections—and in
the wake of a series of political events that were generating increased pressure
for federal civil rights legislation and were also forcing southern politicians to
clarify their position on the “race issue.” For decades southern political leaders
had worried about segregation’s survival in the face of a New Deal political
coalition that welcomed African American votes in the North and in the face
of the ideological pressures of World War II and then the Cold War.37 Those
worries increased in the aftermath of Brown in 1954, the murder of Emmett Till
and the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955, the riots caused by Autherine Lucy’s
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arrival at the University of Alabama in 1956, and other events. To resist the
pressure for federal legislation, Southern Caucus members needed to create a
legislative coalition with Republican senators outside the South who were
uncomfortable with overtly racist rhetoric. But they also had to defend
segregation vigorously enough to prevent a challenge from a reactionary third
party, like the one launched by the States Rights Party in 1948.38
As they sought those twin goals, Ervin and other members of the Southern
Caucus oﬀered normative defenses of segregation. They sometimes argued
that it was a broadly supported method of preserving racial peace and
recognized divinely mandated racial diﬀerences. Others stressed cultural
diﬀerences and emphasized the need for southerners to address the problems
of racial divisions through their own (achingly slow) process. But those
appeals to southern cultural norms were not their core argument.39
As Keith Findley has documented, the caucus’s primary strategy was to
use constitutional arguments and an associated interpretation of American
history to portray themselves as waging a battle to protect traditional American political institutions and the liberty those institutions protected.40 They
based these arguments not on memories of the old South, reconstruction, or
the Civil War; the embrace of that history would undermine their eﬀorts to
attract votes from senators outside the South. Instead, caucus members put
memories of the American Revolution at the center of their arguments and
adopted the classical republicanism of the Founders for their cause. Caucus
members, like the founding fathers before them, were brave patriots ﬁghting
against the concentrated power of “special interest activism” and a distant,
centralized government that conspired to deprive Americans of their traditional and legally guaranteed liberties.41
Ervin had every reason to embrace the caucus’s strategy. His personal
support for segregation was suﬃcient reason to oppose civil rights legislation,
as he regularly made clear.42 But the political situation he faced in North
Carolina made the caucus’s strategy attractive as well. The conﬂict between
moderates and reactionaries was as intense in North Carolina as anywhere else
in the South.43 Moderates were a powerful force in North Carolina in the 1950s
and 60s. In fact, only two members of the state’s congressional delegation
signed the Southern Manifesto immediately, and three members ultimately
declined to sign—North Carolina thus had more nonsigners than any state
other than Texas.44 The presumed frontrunner for the vacant Senate seat had
urged the kind of moderate response that the drafters of the Southern
Manifesto feared. The state’s other senator, Kerr Scott, originally took the
same position.45 When Virginia’s governor held a conference on interposition
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in 1956—a constitutional argument that opponents had a diﬃcult time distinguishing from nulliﬁcation—North Carolina’s governor attended the conference but then declined to formally endorse the theory.46 North Carolina
largely avoided massive resistance—the shuttering of schools and interposition—and instead opposed desegregation with pupil placement plans and
eﬀorts to negotiate with the African American population. Racial demagoguery and outright threats were relegated to a less overt role.47
Yet North Carolina also had powerful reactionary resistance. A group
called the North Carolina Patriots formed to ﬁght integration in the state and
took clear aim at politicians who did not vigorously oppose the Court’s
desegregation orders. They targeted all three congressmen who refused to
sign the manifesto, defeating two and pushing the third to pursue a racebaiting campaign that saved his seat.48 The group’s 1957 Blue Print for
Resisting Integration encouraged its chapters to remind oﬃcials that the
Patriots had caused those electoral defeats.49 They pushed Senator Scott to
embrace the state’s student-choice program, which was an eﬀort to stymie the
Brown decision, even though he had opposed defying the Court order in his
1954 campaign.50 As much as any other members of the Southern Caucus,
Ervin needed to show reactionaries that he was one of them without frightening moderates.
Combining appeals to Founding Era republicanism and constitutional
law oﬀered Ervin a clear path to do that, just as it did other members of the
Southern Caucus. These appeals attracted the support of moderates for the
same reasons that pupil placement plans did: they protected segregation
through the traditional legal mechanisms and avoided extralegal violence or
overtly white supremacist rhetoric.51 Those appeals also simultaneously made
clear to reactionaries that Ervin and his colleagues would not compromise in
their defense of segregation. As Ervin regularly repeated, if a bill was unconstitutional, senators and representatives had a duty to oppose it regardless of
its putative values.52 No political horse trading would be permissible. But
perhaps more important, when Ervin defended what he deﬁned as traditional
American institutions and liberties, he was defending ideals that racial reactionaries had themselves deﬁned as the product of white supremacy. Thus,
they would have interpreted his defense of those ideals as a defense of white
supremacy itself.
The leader of the North Carolina Patriots, W. C. George, explicitly
embraced white supremacy and tied it to a defense of traditional constitutional
values that raised originalist themes.53 “All the evidence that I know about,”
wrote George, a professor at the University of North Carolina School of
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Medicine, “indicates that the Caucasian race is superior to the Negro race in
the creation and maintenance of what we call civilization.”54 Brown raised two
“fateful questions,” according to George: “Are we going to have a white or a
mulatto posterity?” and “Are we going to have a Constitution as the foundation and safeguard of our liberties . . . ?”55 He expected both whiteness and the
Constitution to win out, in part because they were linked. “Our people,” he
wrote, “reared in a tradition of freedom, are ordered to accept the dissolution
of the Bill of Rights with ‘all deliberate speed.’”56 They would not, he believed,
abandon those liberties—liberties that George, like Ervin, traced to Americans’ Anglo-Saxon forefathers. “Since the year 1215,” George asserted, “when
our American [sic] forebears forced King John to sign the Great Charter, the
forerunner of our Constitution, Anglo Saxon peoples have not tolerated
tyranny for long.”57 “Constitutional government,” he wrote elsewhere, “that
helps to restrain the growth of tyranny” was one of the “conceptions and
achievements of the white race.”58 To reach its decision in Brown, the Court
had to “reverse the understanding [the Fourteenth] Amendment had at the
time of its adoption and the meaning that has been upheld by the courts until
now.”59 Because the Court had ignored “constitutional processes,” he argued,
“morally and constitutionally the law of the land remains at it was in 1954,”
before the ruling.60 The people must take action to prevent the Court from
taking such steps. “Otherwise [they] will lose the very foundation of their
liberty, that is, the Constitution as written and adopted.”61
With looming pressure to appeal to moderates, reactionaries, and Republicans, Ervin enthusiastically embraced the Southern Manifesto’s approach,
even pushing the document’s primary drafter, Richard Russell, to further
emphasize analogies between the southern ﬁght against Brown and the
Founding Fathers’ ﬁght against a distant and despotic British government.62
In his suggested edits, Ervin urged Russell to point out that the Founders had
framed a written constitution in response to the “tragic truth” of history that
no one can be trusted with unlimited power.”63 He even wanted Russell to add
an explicit statement supporting the theory of originalism: “In the very nature
of things,” he suggested that Russell add, “the meaning of a written constitution is ﬁxed when it is adopted, and is not diﬀerent at any subsequent time.”64
The ﬁnal version of the manifesto did not incorporate those suggestions.
It certainly makes arguments based on original intent. For example, the
manifesto claims that “the debates preceding the submission of Fourteenth
Amendment clearly show that there was no intent that it should aﬀect the
systems of [segregated] education maintained by the states” because “the very
Congress which proposed the amendment subsequently provided for
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segregated schools in the District of Columbia.”65 The document was nevertheless not expressly originalist. It never identiﬁed a preferred interpretive
theory. Instead, it wove together arguments from original intent, precedent,
pragmatism, and structure: Plessy vs. Ferguson, reliance interests by many
states, the chaos and confusion produced by the decision, and its destruction
of “amicable relations between the white and Negro races” were all part of it
critique of Brown.66
Although the manifesto did not explicitly embrace originalism, it was a
turning point for the constitutional theorist of the Southern Caucus. For
decades, Richard Russell, John Stennis of Mississippi, and other members of
the committee that drafted the Southern Manifesto had been using constitutional arguments to ward oﬀ civil rights legislation.67 Ervin’s commitment to
help them succeed in the newly intensiﬁed ﬁght against civil rights legislation
meant his focus shifted from ﬁnding the best legal argument against federally
mandated desegregation to identifying the best way to solve the Southern
Caucus’s delicate political problem. That new focus led Ervin to see that
originalism’s weakness in professional legal argument was outweighed by its
strength in political debate. Originalism helped connect revered American
ﬁgures and traditions to segregationist arguments. It thus made the defense of
segregation more appealing to both northern senators and southern moderates while simultaneously signaling to reactionaries that the Southern Caucus
their racialized understanding of core American values and would never
compromise in defense of the South’s traditional institutions. Those advantages alone may have been enough to lead Ervin to embrace originalism, but as
the ﬁght for civil rights increasingly turned from the courts to Congress, he
found the theory had a another advantage: it allowed Ervin and his colleagues
to raise constitutional objections to civil rights bills even in the face of
increasingly convincing claims that the bills were constitutional under recent
Supreme Court precedent.

from community values to individual rights
Following his work on the Southern Manifesto, Ervin began to consistently
defend originalism as the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. In a subcommittee hearing on the 1959 Civil Rights Act, he argued that
“a court has the right to reverse itself when its original decision on a constitutional question was not in conformity with the intention of the persons who
drew and ratiﬁed the constitutional provision. I deny that a court has a right to
place an interpretation upon the Constitution at variance with the intention of
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those who framed and adopted the Constitution.”68 Four years later, in
Judiciary Committee hearings on the 1964 Civil Right Act, Ervin argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning was determined by “the intent of those
who framed and ratiﬁed it.” The “fundamental principle of constitutional
construction,” he said, is “to give eﬀect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and the people adopting it.”69
Ervin’s embrace of originalism after 1956 made him a particularly powerful opponent of federal civil rights laws, particularly the Civil Rights Acts of
1957, 1960, and 1964. To stop or weaken those laws, Ervin and his colleagues
sought the support of anti–New Deal Republicans, who were less attracted to
constitutional arguments about federalism than to claims about individual
rights—particularly property rights and the right to trial by jury. Originalism
helped make Ervin’s constitutional arguments about individual rights more
eﬀective in two ways. It helped Ervin explain how a former North Carolina
Supreme Court justice, who in 1954 had never questioned the authority of the
state to aggressively exercise its police power to tightly control property rights
and rights of association in the name of segregation, became a champion of
property rights, individual rights, and limited government: not inveterate
racism, but principled dedication to the Constitution. It also allowed Ervin
to defend his constitutional arguments against the powerful charge that the
civil rights laws were constitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent.
Ervin deployed very similar arguments against the Civil Rights Acts of
1957, 1960, and 1964. He opposed them not because he was a racist but because
he was protecting well-established and legally binding constitutional traditions. He made structural arguments about federalism and the separation of
powers, pointing to a variety of constitutional provisions (especially those in
article 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment), as well as arguments concerning
individual rights (like the right to a jury trial). He then strengthened those
arguments by characterizing them as an expression of a political philosophy
that he attributed to the Founders. Traditional American institutions and
ideals, he argued, were under attack from an overweening federal government
and particularistic interest groups, above all the “agitators” at the NAACP.
Southern senators were the defenders of constitutional principles that dated to
the nation’s founding and that were legally binding.70
Ervin ﬁrst used this strategy to ﬁght Title IV of the Eisenhower administration’s 1957 Civil Rights Act. The impetus for the 1957 act, the ﬁrst civil
rights legislation since Reconstruction, was the administration’s desire to
attract African American votes in northern states, and its speciﬁc goal was
to protect black suﬀrage. The bill easily passed in the House and strong
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Republican support meant that a southern ﬁlibuster might fail, so the Southern Caucus sought to remove the most threatening parts of the bill: Titles III
and IV.71 A broad array of senators challenged Title III on policy and legal
grounds. Authorizing the US attorney general to initiate civil proceedings on
behalf of individual voters who had been denied the right to vote, as Title III
did, was unnecessary and an unwise centralization of power that could lead to
military enforcement of school desegregation.72
Ervin led the charge against Title IV, which allowed contempt proceedings in any civil rights case brought by the attorney general to be tried by a
federal judge rather than a jury. The administration argued that this change
was necessary because southern juries might refuse to convict state oﬃcials
who violated civil rights laws.73 Ervin denied southern juries would do any
such thing,74 but his primary argument was that dishonest interest groups—
namely, the NAACP—and power-hungry bureaucrats were attacking the
traditional protections of freedom and liberty. The bill, he claimed, was
“deliberately designed” to give the attorney general “autocratic power” by
robbing people in civil rights disputes of the “basic and invaluable safeguards
created by the Founding Fathers and Congress to protected all Americans
from bureaucratic and judicial tyranny,” including the right to a grand jury
indictment, the right to avoid double jeopardy, and most important, the right
to a trial by jury.75 King John used similar approaches against his English
subjects and by King George against his American subjects.76 By breaching
those rights, the bill undermined free institutions, removing “the thin wedge of
reserved power which separates our legal system from the monolithic totalitarian system of justice which prevails behind the Iron and Bamboo
Curtains.”77
Ervin transformed these historical and normative claims into a constitutional one by deploying originalism.78 Crafting his constitutional argument
was not easy, as he was unable to cite any case that identiﬁed a constitutional
right to a jury trial in a contempt hearing in which the government was a party.
In fact, he did not even attempt to make an argument based on precedent. Nor
could Ervin point to any text in the Constitution that referred to this right. As
he noted, the Constitution mentioned equity hearings only once, in a jurisdictional provision, and it limited the right to a jury trial to criminal cases.79
But the original intent of the founders and ratiﬁers, Ervin argued, made the bill
unconstitutional.
The Founders, he argued, did not extend the right to jury trial past
criminal trials because when the Constitution was adopted, equitable remedies
were used only to protect property rights.80 According to Ervin, the Founders
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believed that requiring jury trials in criminal cases was suﬃcient to thwart
those who “would convert courts of equity into courts of star chamber” by
“extending the powers of equity beyond their ancient limits.” Moreover, he
continued, history showed that the Constitution never would have been
ratiﬁed if Americans had understood that they could be “robbed of their right
to trial by jury by perverting injunctions and contempt proceedings from their
historical uses to the ﬁeld of criminal law.” These intentions of the Founders
and the understanding of those who ratiﬁed the Constitution, he concluded,
meant that when the Constitution guaranteed that “the trial of all crimes shall
be by jury,” it did more than ensure jury trials in criminal trials. It also
“necessarily invalidates by implication any proposal to rob Americans of their
right to jury trial by extending the injunction and contempt processes of equity
to the criminal ﬁeld.”81
Ervin used a similar approach in his ﬁght against the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.82 The 1964 Civil Rights Act included a jury trial exemption for contempt
proceedings in civil rights cases—just like the 1957 Civil Rights Act had—and
Ervin and his colleagues attacked that provision just as they had before. But in
response to the Birmingham protests, the murder of Medgar Evers, and
Martin Luther King Jr.’s March on Washington, the Kennedy administration
had made the 1964 Act into much more than just a voting rights act: it was a
direct attack on segregation. Title II prohibited segregation in any place of
public accommodation with a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.83 Unwilling to compromise on that issue, hardline members of the
Southern Caucus, including Ervin, focused on attracting enough Republican
votes to sustain a ﬁlibuster.84 To appeal to Republicans, the caucus did as it had
before: obfuscate racial issues and claim that the bill’s constitutional inﬁrmities would produce federal and bureaucratic tyranny.85 As before, the caucus
claimed that it was ﬁghting to protect the individual rights that the nation’s
Founding Fathers had enshrined in the Constitution.86
Since the right to jury trial was immaterial to Title II, the Southern Caucus
grounded its opposition in another set of individual rights: the rights to
property and free association. Together, those rights allowed individual
Americans to discriminate in their private lives, should they so choose.87 By
prohibiting discrimination, the caucus argued, the federal government interfered with the rights of property owners to decide how to use their own
property. It also prevented individuals from choosing who they wanted to
associate with. Those arguments, of course, were directly contrary to their
recent support for state segregation laws that interfered with both property
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and associational rights—but they seemed unconcerned about the contradiction.88
As before, Ervin played a leading role in defending these arguments and
did so, in part, by deploying originalism. In July and August 1963, Ervin used
his position on the Judiciary Committee to turn the Senate hearings on the
Civil Rights Act into a six-day debate with Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy over the bill’s constitutionality—a debate the newspapers dubbed
“The Sam and Bobby Show.” He then formalized his arguments in an article
published in the North Carolina Law Review.89 In both places, Ervin deployed
multiple modalities of constitutional argument—precedent, constitutional
structure, and text. He pointed to the Founders as honored authorities and
identiﬁed principles of American democracy. But every time he identiﬁed an
approach to constitutional interpretation, he identiﬁed originalism. He told
Kennedy, for example, that it is only the power to interpret the Constitution
that “belongs to the Court, and that is only the power to ascertain and give
eﬀect to the intent of those who drafted and those who ratiﬁed the Constitution.90 He repeated those claims in the North Carolina Law Review and
elsewhere, including a speech at the University of Alabama Law School in
April 1965. It was “as clear as the noonday sun,” he declared there, that the
Supreme Court’s role “is simply to ascertain and give eﬀect to the intent of
[the] framers [of the Constitution] and the people who adopted it.”91
Ervin’s originalism was particularly useful in his debate with Kennedy
and others over the constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, because it
allowed him to counter the powerful argument that recent precedent made
clear the Supreme Court would uphold the law (as it later did).92 “At the very
beginning,” Ervin wrote in the North Carolina Law Review, “I must declare my
opposition to those who hold that a Senator should . . . [rely] on the Supreme
Court to supply the judgment as to the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality” of the Civil Rights Act.93 “It is up to the Congress as a
whole,” he insisted, “and to each individual Representative and Senator to
remember his oath [to uphold the Constitution] and to protect the original
meaning of the Constitution.”94
Ervin used originalism to challenge nearly every section of the bill, but he
focused particularly on Title II’s prohibition of segregation in places of public
accommodation. Ervin argued that Title II was unconstitutional because it
went beyond Congress’s authority both to regulate interstate commerce under
article 1, section 8, and to prohibit discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Wickard v. Filburn had established
that the federal government could use its commerce power to regulate goods
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that aﬀected a national market—but that was quite diﬀerent, he argued, from
interfering with the rights of a business owner to decide whom to hire or to
whom he would sell.95 According to Ervin, the equal protection clause did not
support Title II because the Fourteenth Amendment’s language as well as
long-established precedent showed that the clause applied only to “state
action,” not the action of private citizens.96
These arguments are arguments about federalism, not individual rights.
Individual rights arguments focus not on whether the federal government can
regulate a particular behavior, but on whether that behavior can be regulated
at all. The arguments Ervin advanced against the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not
make that claim. If Title II exceeded Congress’s authority either because a
prohibition on segregation in places of public accommodation was not a
legitimate regulation of interstate commerce or because that prohibition
regulated private rather than state action, it would mean that Congress could
not regulate segregation. But it would say nothing at all about whether the
states could pass the exact same kind of antidiscrimination law under their
police power.
Ervin typically argued that the primary problem with the 1964 Civil Rights
Act was its unconstitutional extension of federal power.97 But he wove those
federalism arguments so tightly together with his arguments about the bill’s
violation of property rights, associational rights, and the “right to
discriminate” that it is hard to untangle the diﬀerent strands of his critique.98
In a passage in his North Carolina Law Review article that exempliﬁes the
intertwined nature of these arguments, Ervin claimed that the bill was “revolutionizing our traditional understanding of the meaning of liberty within
the American Federal System.”99 He achieved this integration of federalism
and individual rights arguments by building on long-standing arguments that
the primary importance of federalism was that it protected individual liberty.
“The reason for the preservation of the federal system,” Ervin wrote, “is that
that system is the best guarantor of our fundamental liberties.”100 To support
this idea, Ervin cited not only existing precedent, but also a 1963 New Republic
article by Yale law professor Robert Bork, who called for more debate on the
“cost of freedom that must be paid for such legislation [Title II], and the
morality of enforcing morals through law.”101 Echoing Bork’s analysis, Ervin
wrote that the “chief substantive demerit of proposed civil rights legislation
[was] the loss of traditional liberty guaranteed by, among other things, the
federal system, in an attempt to legislate equality.”102
This argument shifted the critique of the bill away from overtly racist
arguments and toward grounds that would have been particularly appealing to
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conservative Republicans, whose thirty-three votes held the balance of power
in the Senate.103 Nevertheless, this strategy failed to achieve its primary goal of
blocking the bill. After ﬁfty-four days, the Senate voted to end the Southern
Caucus’s ﬁlibuster—but even then Ervin did not give up the ﬁght, joining
South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond in exhausting the amendment
process before the act was ﬁnally brought to a vote.104 The 1964 Civil Rights
Act passed the Senate, with only Barry Goldwater and four other GOP
senators joining the caucus in voting against it.105 A year later Ervin and
other caucus members waged a similarly doomed battle against the 1965
Voting Rights Act. Despite these failures, Ervin’s ﬁght against civil rights
legislation had important impacts. As eﬀorts to oppose new forms of segregation continued—particularly segregation created by white ﬂight to the
suburbs—the arguments that these southern senators developed and that
Ervin honed would remerge.106 But in the future, these arguments would
not be limited to matters of segregation.

ervin, originalism, and the new right
Ervin’s political world changed rapidly after the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. One transformation was caused by the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
which substantially increased the political power of African Americans and
thus led even some of the loudest practitioners of racial demagoguery to adopt
more inclusive rhetoric. Thurmond of South Carolina, Herman Talmadge of
Georgia, and George Wallace of Alabama all openly sought African American
votes after these political and societal transformations.107 Ervin followed a
similar path. Even after his retirement, he continued to believe that the 1965
Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional, but he abandoned his opposition to
Brown, belatedly admitting the decision was correct.108 Ervin’s political
context was also reshaped by changes in the political economy of North
Carolina and the nation that created a new conservative politics in increasingly aﬄuent suburbs, especially in the Sun Belt. There, an emphasis on
business development and property rights undermined labor unions and
racial liberalism and helped create the New Right.109 The marriage of constitutionalism, originalism, and individual rights that Ervin used in his ﬁght
against the 1964 Civil Rights Act failed to stop that legislation, but it did help
Ervin adjust to those new political challenges.
Ervin certainly did not back away from originalism after 1964. For the rest
of his career, in ﬂoor debates, hearings, and public speeches, he defended
originalism as the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. He
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based his support of Warren Burger’s nomination as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, for example, on his perception of Burger as someone who was
willing “to lay aside his personal notions of what a constitutional provision
ought to say and to base his interpretation of its meaning solely upon its
language and history.”110 The appointment of such a justice, Ervin believed,
would “begin a return to constitutional government in the United States as far
as the Supreme Court is concerned.”111 In a 1970 debate with former attorney
general Ramsey Clark, Ervin argued that “the function of the Court is simply
to ascertain and give eﬀect to the intent of those who framed and ratiﬁed the
provision in issue.”112 In a 1981 article in the conservative journal Modern Age,
he argued that the Supreme Court had only the power to interpret the
Constitution, which consisted of “the power . . . to determine the meaning
of the Constitution as established by the Founding Fathers.”113 He cited for
support recent books by Raoul Berger and Lino A. Graglia, two scholars
universally accepted today as early originalists.114
Ervin’s emphasis on the constitution, and originalism in particular,
helped him navigate the new racial politics of the Democratic Party in the
South. A key part of that shift was Ervin’s adoption of the “color-blind”
interpretation of Brown. In 1963, Ervin endorsed Fourth Circuit judge John
Parker’s conclusion that Brown did not require racially mixed schools; it only
prohibited the government-enforced racial separation.115 Thus interpreted,
Brown stood for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
all race-based government programs, school segregation as well as race-based
programs intended to ameliorate racial inequality. The Amendment thus
prohibited, Ervin argued, both school busing in the 1970s and aﬃrmative
action.116 In 1985, when Ervin ﬁnally formally explained how he had shifted his
view of Brown, he justiﬁed his reversal with originalism. His careful study of
the debates surrounding the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had
convinced him the decision was consistent with original intent of the amendment’s framers.117
Originalism also helped align Ervin’s political philosophy with the individualist, right-based conservatism around which Southern Democrats and
anti–New Deal Republicans were congregating.118 By the 1980s, Ervin had
abandoned the communitarian support for state power that he had supported
as a judge and adopted instead a political rhetoric centered on individual
rights. After 1964, Ervin increasingly emphasized that government’s core
purpose was to protect individual freedom, which he consistently deﬁned as
freedom from government. Government oﬃcials— judges, elected oﬃcials,
and others—were bound to protect the structural constitutional limits like
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federalism and separation of powers that the founders used to protect that
freedom. But the Constitution’s direct protection of individual liberty in the
bill of rights increasingly moved to center stage in Ervin’s rhetoric. By the
1970s the First Amendment’s free-speech clause was a favorite talking point,
and he often tied his political philosophy to it. In their remarkable wisdom,
Ervin declared, the Founding Fathers had limited the authority of government
in order that Americans might be protected from harmful policies (such as
using busing to integrate schools) and wrong-headed social theories (such as
those that justiﬁed the Miranda warning).119 By defending these traditional
and established, if not timeless, principles, Ervin positioned himself in opposition to the tyranny he said would occur as bureaucrats and activist judges
imposed faddish, academic theories that he argued would advance particularistic interests rather than liberty for all. Ervin justiﬁed his shift from a
communitarian embrace of segregation to an individualist protection of
property rights by claiming that his shift was no shift at all. Just as he had
in his attack on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and before,
he argued that his defense of individual rights was nothing but the product of
his principled commitment to the traditional American values that the
Constitution made legally binding.120
Ervin’s originalism had not only rhetorical resonances with the language
of the emerging New Right, but it also had substantial overlap with conservative’s policy concerns. That overlap was not complete. Ervin recognized that
the Constitution sometimes had unclear implications for current controversies or had no implications at all. He sometimes found that the Constitution
required what could be seen as liberal results. To the chagrin of religious
conservatives, he fought to allow individual taxpayers to challenge government funding of religious schools and argued that once the Court heard such a
case, the Constitution’s original meaning would require the Court to invalidate those funding laws.121 Ervin also regularly defended the rights of the
accused on constitutional grounds.122 “No knock” warrants, he claimed,
violated the Fourth Amendment, and preventive detention for particularly
dangerous accused criminals violated the Sixth Amendment.123 Perhaps most
notably, as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
Ervin fought for individual rights in a variety of contexts on behalf of a variety
of interests.124 But generally, and almost always on the most important issues,
his originalist interpretation of the Constitution had implications that overlapped with the interests of the emerging New Right. He found Miranda
v. Arizona, busing to achieve racial balance, and Roe v. Wade inconsistent with
the original intentions of the Founders as expressed in the Constitution.125 His
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concern with protecting the original understanding of separation of powers,
he explained to the Board of Directors of the National Association of Manufacturers in 1968, led him to oppose both an activist judiciary and the
National Labor Relation Board’s eﬀorts to protect labor unions from right
to work laws.126
Exemplary of the way Ervin’s originalism ﬁt with the ideas and interests of
the emerging New Right was his speech against the Dirksen Bill in 1966, one
year after he and the Southern Caucus lost their ﬁght against the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Senate minority leader Everett M. Dirksen’s bill proposed a
constitutional amendment that would allow school administrators to provide
for voluntary student prayer. Given Ervin’s criticism of the Court’s decision to
prohibit prayer in public schools in 1962 and 1963, many expected him to
support Dirksen’s bill, along with the forty-nine other senators who ultimately
voted for it. Instead, Ervin spoke out against the amendment, citing the
Founders’ vision of the separation between church and state.127 Critics found
it inconsistent that an opponent of civil rights would stand up for civil liberties,
but Ervin saw no contradiction. He claimed that his support for the separation
of church and state and his opposition to civil rights legislation both resulted
from his veneration of the Constitution. His opposition to the Dirksen Bill,
Ervin said during one of his most noted speeches on the Senate ﬂoor, was
motivated by his “devotion to local self-government and individual freedom.”
And it was that same devotion that led him to oppose two other bills that same
session. The ﬁrst was the “federal forced housing law,” commonly known as
the Civil Rights Act of 1966, which barred racial discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing. The second bill was to repeal section 14(b) of the TaftHartley Act of 1947, the provision that protected the “right to work,” which
was a primary target of labor unions.128

conclusion
The originalism Ervin espoused for almost his entire career as a US Senator
and afterward was not a simple rejection of the Warren Court or its rights
revolution. Nor was it a simple ﬁg leaf for a set of conservative policy positions.
After 1965, Ervin regularly supported and sometimes even fought to extend the
Warren Court’s individual rights-based decisions on originalist grounds,
particularly in the areas of religious freedom and free speech. And he never
abandoned the Democratic Party. But his originalism nevertheless had important implications for the rise of a powerful conservative movement centered
on the Republican Party. It provided an ideological pathway that made a set of
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speciﬁc political issues appear to be naturally connected. Among other ideas,
opposition to bureaucratic government, support for free markets, religion, and
traditional social norms, and a tight association among property rights,
economic individualism, and liberty were linked together through Ervin’s
historical discourse then made binding law by his originalist interpretation of
the Constitution. Those positions could thus be presented not as contestable
and self-interested policy preferences, but as fundamental American values.
This political and constitutional discourse did not emerge fully formed
and ready for either Ervin or the New Right to pick up. Along with others,
Ervin developed it over time and in response to a rapidly changing set of
political challenges—from opposing Brown, to ﬁghting civil rights legislation,
to protecting the unity and authority of the Democratic Party, to addressing
the economic needs of the increasingly suburban and economically modern
Sunbelt. As he addressed those challenges, Ervin’s views changed substantially. He arrived at the Senate in 1954 as a supporter of a communitarian vision
of state authority powerful enough to enforce a system of segregation that
required a remarkable number of restrictions on individual autonomy. His
primary political goals were to protect that system and the power of the
Democratic Party. He retired from the Senate twenty years later as a wellknown supporter of individual rights and proponent of a color-blind Constitution. Ervin used his considerable skill as a constitutional theorist to justify
those changes, and by doing so helped generate a network of ideas that helped
guide many of his fellow conservative white southerners to a new political
identity, which many continue to embrace.
University of Georgia, School of Law, USA
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